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Abstract
This article analyses Venezuelan antipoverty programmes under the presidency of Hugo
Cha´vez, the leader of the ‘Bolivarian Revolution’ (1998–present). Support for poor people has
become the government’s trademark since the creation in 2002–03 of a series of emergency
social programmes, the Missions. These programmes attend to the basic needs of low-income
individuals in terms of nutrition, health and education. The Missions are characterised by a
pattern of institutional bypassing which makes their long-term institutionalisation difficult. Do
the Missions really introduce a break with previous social policies? To answer this question, we
first analyse the evolution of the Venezuelan social state. Second, we review the development of
the Missions, especially the Mission Vuelvan Caras, now Che Guevara, an active labour market
programme. Third, we provide an assessment of the Social Missions and identify ruptures
and continuities with past social assistance policies. The main contention is that the Missions
exhibit a strong pattern of path dependency, despite the ideological and discursive ruptures
that have attended the presidency of Hugo Cha´vez.
Introduction
This article investigates the extent to which antipoverty programmes known
as the Social Missions in Hugo Cha´vez’s Venezuela represent a real rupture
in Venezuelan social policies. Venezuela, like most Latin American countries,
possesses a system of social protection that is both hybrid and highly fragmented.
Social security is contributory based and linked to occupational status, with high
coverage for workers in the public sector and almost no coverage for workers
in the informal economy. In the 1950s and 1960s, the state played a crucial role
in economic and social development under the auspices of a Keynesian/social
investment paradigm. The state extracted resources from staples export and
import of manufactured goods in order to achieve a pattern of inward growth,
based on de-coupling from Western economies (Filgueira, 2005: 10; Munck,
2008: 53). In 1958, the Punto Fijo regime established a social pact between the two
main governing parties and the trade unions based on the petro state’s role as
entrepreneur, employer and provider of social welfare. As in other Latin American
countries, there was a strong aspiration to provide health care and education on a
universal basis (Abel and Lewis, 2002; Barrientos, 2004; Draibe and Riesco, 2007;
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Filgueira, 2005). This model came to a halt in the 1980s, when the dependency
on oil revenues appeared to be no longer sustainable.
Like most Latin American governments in the 1980s and 1990s, the
government of Carlos Andre´s Pe´rez implemented austerity measures referred
to as the Gran Viraje (the Great U-Turn). The Venezuelan social pact – the
redistribution of oil revenues to the majority of the population in exchange for
political support for the regime – was in practice dismantled. In an effort to
contain the rising tide of poverty, the government implemented ad hoc cash
transfer programmes, with little success. It was in this context that Hugo Cha´vez
became head of the Venezuelan state in 1998. The new president promised to
break away from the neo-liberal policies of his predecessors and to place human
welfare at the heart of the ‘Bolivarian Revolution’ (1998–present).
In 1998, a new social policy paradigm was developed based on the idea that
the enabling state had to encourage bottom–up initiatives in order to ensure that
local communities effectively manage and own social policies. What emerged was
a form of positive discrimination for poor people since the state had to ensure
universal access to basic social services such as health, education and nutrition,
while at the same time ensuring preferential access to these services for the most
vulnerable (Pozas, 2005: 105). The Missions are based on the politics of targeting
since they are established in areas with high poverty rates. To live above the
poverty line one must be able to buy two baskets of goods per person in a given
household. In 2010, the international poverty line is US$1.25 a day. Individuals
whose daily income is less than US$1.25 a day fall into the extreme poverty or
indigence category. Given that such indicators are not always readily available, the
government often uses the high density of ranchos (crudely brick-built and often
precarious slum dwellings) as a proxy for indentifying poor urban areas, where
a majority of resources are being concentrated. The new social policy model can
be best defined as a sort of local universalism, in the sense that there is a real
effort to eradicate poverty and to address all dimensions of social exclusion. It
must be noted, however, that the government has so far been unable to reform
the social security system in order to provide universal coverage to all citizens,
regardless of their occupational status. This means that this universalism remains
an aspiration rather than a reality.
This tension between universalism and targeted support for poor people is
at the heart of the current debate on social policy in Venezuela. Partisans of a
universal-institutional social policy model argue that the focus on low-income
individuals operates to the detriment of universal social services such as health
care, thus undermining the establishment of a legal framework of social rights
guaranteed by the Constitution of 1999. But support for poor people is the
government trademark, thus making it particularly difficult for Hugo Cha´vez to
switch back to a more universal logic. The question can be summarised as follows:
are the Missions rooted in a sustainable model that seeks to increase the state’s
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institutional capacities? Or do they represent a short-term response to pressing
social needs, and as such a failure to break away from past social experiences in
Venezuela?
This article is divided into three sections. The first section characterises the
Venezuelan social state based on the development state literature. The second
section analyses the development of the Missions, notably the Mission Vuelvan
Caras, now Che Guevara. This section is based on the qualitative case-study
method. The fact that the government does not publish rigorous quantitative data
means that researchers face more serious difficulties in getting access to reliable
governmental publications than is usually the case in less polarised environments.
As a result, most of the sources are secondary and of qualitative nature. Secondary
sources include in particular unofficial evaluation studies commissioned by
the National Institute for Social investigations, el Instituto Latinoamericano de
Investigaciones Sociales, ILDIS. The ILDIS is a think tank with a social and
political modernisation agenda funded by the German foundation Friedrich
Erbert. The ILDIS publishes comprehensive and critical assessment of social
policies in Venezuela. Primary sources result from a series of ten semi-structured
interviews (in Spanish) with government officials in the Fundacio´n Che Guevara
and the Ministerio del Poder Popular para las Comunas y Proteccio´n Social
(MINEP), the department in charge of social affairs, and in the Misio´n Madres
del Barrio. These interviews were conducted during a research trip in Caracas in
September 2008. In April 2010, the author conducted five further semi-structured
interviews with officials from the Missions Che Guevara and Madres del Barrio. In
addition to these formal interviews, the author visited local development projects
in Caracas and in the city’s surroundings, near the airport Simon Bolivar. These
visits provided the opportunity to conduct informal conversations with officials
and beneficiaries, thus amounting to a form of semi-ethnographic research.
In particular, in September 2008, Emma Hermoso, the vice-minister for the
Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Economı´a Comunal (MINEC, now MINEP)
in charge of social affairs, kindly organised the visit to a ‘socialist commune’, la
comuna Gual y Espan˜a. Gual y Espan˜a had been inaugurated by President Cha´vez
at the end of August 2008 and was subsequently portrayed as a successful example
of what a local alternative to capitalism could look like. It was then that the author
conducted a series of informal conversations with the military1 – as well as with
various cooperative workers and the representative of the MINEC who was in
charge of organising the visit.
This form of semi-ethnographic research is not completely objective, and
the author is of course aware of potential cultural bias or even ideological bias on
her part. New forms of social experiments, with their emphasis on community
participation at the grassroots level, can appear to be amateurish because they lack
the form of technocratic expertise that dominates public policy-making in the
Western world. As a result, the argument presented here is founded on the author’s
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interpretation of secondary sources, interview data and informal observations
and conversations. The third section provides an assessment of the Missions and
identifies ruptures and continuities with previous social assistance policies.
The Venezuelan state in comparative perspective and the crisis of
rentismo
The Venezuelan social state is best defined as an informal-conservative welfare
state. In the 1990s, Latin American societies were characterised by a high level
of informal employment: informal sector employment represented 47 per cent
of total employment, with 52 per cent for Venezuela (Gerstenfeld, 2002: 58).
Households and families provided the main protection against social risks, such
as loss of income due to unemployment, old age or ill health, although the capacity
of families to protect individuals against such risks is declining (Barrientos, 2004:
124–129).
In the typology of Esping-Andersen, the welfare state in Latin America is
conservative/corporatist because the most important component of the nascent
social protection system is social insurance, but on a highly selective and
occupational basis. The social insurance fund, el Instituto Venezolano de los Seguros
Sociales (IVSS), is extremely fragmented. It is constituted of an agglomeration
of specific insurance funds, each fund catering for the needs of its contributing
employees according to a corporatist and clientelist logic. Since 52 per cent of
Venezuelan workers work in the informal economy, the IVSS does not protect
half of the labour force against social risks such as ill health, old age and
unemployment. In the absence of any serious attempt to unify and rationalise the
IVSS, this corporatist and clientelist logic has become increasingly exclusionary
(Polanco, 2006: 230–2).
The Venezuelan social state emerged in its modern form after 1958. The
social protection system was universalist, in the sense that the state guaranteed
access to health and education, in order to improve the level of human capital
and modernise the country. This project of social and economic modernisation
was predominant in the 1950s, 1960s and to a lesser extent the 1970s. The benefits
of oil revenues were redistributed to the middle class and to a much lesser
extent the working class through social programmes, mainly health, education
and subsidised goods and services. This policy was known as ‘sowing the oil’
(International Crisis Group, 2007: 3). But the major contradiction of this model
of social protection laid in its fragmentation and its stratification; access to social
insurance was conditioned by occupational status, with a divide between rural
and urban workers, private and public sector employees, formal and informal
sector employees (D’Elia et al., 2006: 195).
In the 1980s, political elites initiated a radical change in the direction of social
policy, from a universalist model towards a compensatory social assistance model.
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Means-tested policies took the form of conditional cash transfer programmes and
were designed to mitigate the impact of neo-liberal economic policies on the most
vulnerable sections of the population, mainly families, children and older people.
In the early 1980s, Venezuelan society was faced with three main pressures:
the explosion of external debt from 1983, the lack of diversification of the national
economy which reinforced the dependency on oil rents, and lastly the exhaustion
of a redistributive system which had helped maintain a form of social peace in
the 1960s and 1970s (Salamanca, 1994; Kornblith, 1994). Between 1979 and 1989,
under the leadership of the governments of Luis Herrera Campins (1979–84) and
Jaime Lusinchi (1984–89), foreign debt escalated, increasing from $9 billion in
1979 to $30 billion in 1989 (Coronil, 1997: 370–1). Moreover, the quality of public
services deteriorated sharply, especially in health and education. The poverty rate,
defined in terms of individual ability to buy a basket of basic goods and services,
increased from 31 per cent in 1981 to 53 per cent in 1989 (CEPAL, 2008: 8).
The government of Carlos Andre´s Pe´rez announced the implementation of
a structural adjustment plan, the Gran Viraje. This policy meant dismantling
the network of protections that was at the heart of the social pact established
by the Punto Fijo Republic (Coronil, 1997: 376). Neo-liberal economic policies
based on wage restraint and a laisser-faire approach vis-a`-vis the labour market
were advocated by a group of economists trained in North American universities.
These economists belonged to the best business school of Caracas, el Instituto
de Estudioses Superiores de Administracion (IESA). These ‘IESA boys’ were given
senior positions in the new administration (Di John, 2005). They believed that
universal social policies were ineffective. Indeed, it was widely held in the 1980s
and 1990s that it was best to concentrate spending efforts on the poorest sections
of the population, especially women and young children (Mkandawire, 2005).
In this context, Carlos Andre´s Pe´rez launched the Anti-Poverty Programme,
Plan de Enfrentamiento a la Pobreza (PEP) in 1989–90 (Chacı´n, 2003: 27).
The PEP was very much inspired by the New Social Policy Agenda promoted
by the World Bank in the 1990s (Mkandawire, 2004; Molyneux, 2006: 429–
31). Four major principles underpinned the New Social Policy Agenda: (1)
decentralised social services are deemed more efficient than central state
bureaucracies; (2) non-governmental organisations (NGOs) play an active role
in service delivery and policy design at grassroots levels; (3) empowerment of
programme beneficiaries is promoted through community participation; and
(4) programmes are administered by independent administrative units in order
to bypass traditional state agencies.
The PEP included programmes such as direct food subsidies for families in
need (Beca Alimentaria), child care centres in poor neighbourhoods and rural
areas, nutritional supplement for expecting mothers and the newborn (PAMI),
a social investment fund aimed at financing urban infrastructure in the barrios
(FONVIS) and support for micro-enterprise programmes. An intergovernmental
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unit, la Comisio´n Presidencial para el Enfrentamiento de la Pobreza, supervised
policy coordination and implementation (Navarro, 1997: 30–66). The Ministry
of Family became responsible for programme design and implementation, but,
as a result of weak institutional capacity at the central level, the government came
to rely on ad hoc parallel organisations, the foundations or social funds which
were set up to support community initiatives and which involved emergent
NGOS. Each foundation was responsible for the implementation of a specific
programme (Foundations PAMI, FONVIS, FONCOFIN, etc.). These foundations
bypassed the traditional state structures, which were seen as inefficient and
lacking flexibility and reactivity. The creation of parallel structures to government
agencies has been and remains a central element of social assistance programmes
in Latin America (Barrientos and Santiba´n˜ez, 2009: 7). These compensatory
programmes became institutionalised and were placed under the responsibility
of the Venezuelan Agency in 1996. The Venezuelan Agency administered no
fewer than 14 social assistance programmes, especially support for the most
vulnerable sections of the population (family benefits, nutritional supplement
programme distributed in schools, nutritional programme for expectant mothers
and newborns as well as pre and post-natal care, PAMI).
Employment and activation programmes (vocational education for
young people)
Antipoverty programmes were characterised by a lack of political
and institutional accountability, high spending volatility and short-term
opportunistic bureaucratic behaviour. As policy implementation relied on ad
hoc units created outside the remit of traditional ministries, there was a frequent
turf war between these new ad hoc units and the traditional ministries that
continued to control part of the programme operation, thus jeopardising effective
programme implementation and coverage (Navarro, 1997: 46–52).
The inability of the traditional governing elites to come up with alternative
policies, as well as their perceived indifference to the population’s plight, accen-
tuated the crisis of legitimacy and representativeness of the Punto Fijo Republic.
Against this background, Hugo Cha´vez was swept into power by a heterogeneous
coalition, with elements from the far left, but also the traditional right.
The Missions: analysis of a social programme
When Hugo Cha´vez became President in 1998, he inherited a deeply impoverished
and highly polarised country. However, the government did not break away from
prudent economic management (Buxton, 2003: 124). Instead, the government
stabilised the economic situation and designed a new constitution, the Bolivarian
Constitution of 1999. The new administration was fully committed to the idea
of a universal welfare state with a right to ‘life, work, culture, education, social
justice and equality’, as formalised by Title III of the new constitution (Buxton,
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2003: 127). Central to the Bolivarian social model was the idea of empowerment
of the poor through community participation and NGOs’ involvement in social
policy initiatives (Buxton, 2007). Although the government did not implement
new social innovations, at least during the period 1999–2003 (Chacı´n, 2003;
Maingon, 2004), it nevertheless recalibrated previous antipoverty programmes.
It also created a Unified Social Fund (FUS) in order to centralise all budgetary
initiatives for social programmes (Penfold-Beccera, 2007). However, the only real
innovation was the Plan Bolivar 2000 directly managed by the armed forces.
In 2003, as the country dipped into a political and economic crisis aggravated
by a failed coup and an oil strike, Cha´vez’s popularity among his core constituency
severely deteriorated: support for Cha´vez among the lowest income group was
about 34 per cent, down from 94 per cent at the start of the administration
(Corrales, 2005: 113). The degradation of living standards of poor and middle-
class people obliged the government to provide a quick response to pressing social
needs. Indeed, poverty rates (the proportion of individuals in households unable
to buy basic goods and services) started rising again in 2001, from 39 per cent
in 2001 to 55.1 per cent in 2003. Meanwhile, extreme poverty (the proportion
of individuals estimated to be living on the equivalent of less than US$1.25 per
day) rose from 14.4 per cent in 2001 to 25 per cent in 2003 (Molina, 2003).
The government created a series of emergency social programmes, the Missions,
in order to attend to the basic needs of low-income individuals in terms of
nutrition, health and education. The Missions played an important role in the
electoral mobilisation of Cha´vez’s key constituency during the campaign for a
recall referendum initiated by the opposition in 2004. The government ran a
highly successful electoral campaign based on the theme ‘Que no te quiten tus
misiones’ (‘Don’t let them take your missions’).
The Missions are national social assistance programmes regulated by national
legislation. They are grounded on a multi-dimensional view of poverty, and aim to
act on several dimensions of poverty at once (Barrientos and Santinabez, 2009:
12). They target the poorest and use a variety of selection methods, including
geographical proxies such as the number of ranchos in a given area and means tests.
The Missions are funded mainly by the central government budget and by oil rev-
enues from the national oil company, PdVSA (Petro´leos de Venezuela). Each Mis-
sion is created by a presidential decree, which defines the budget of the Mission.
The best-known and popular Missions, Barrio Adentro and Mercal, were
originally created in the municipality of Caracas in 2003 in order to attend to
urgent health and alimentation needs. In February 2003, the city of Caracas asked
the Cuban government to send Cuban doctors to deprived neighbourhoods,
the barrios. Health care centres were set up in the heart of the barrios and
Cuban doctors provided on-site services. The programme was first piloted
on an experimental basis, and was then rolled out nationally. In December
2003, Hugo Cha´vez created by decree the Mission Barrio Adentro. The Mission
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Table 1. Overview of the main Missions
Barrio Adentro To attend health care needs in the barrios
Mercal To attend to basic alimentation needs through the provision
of subsidised food in government-sponsored
cooperatives
Identidad Provision of ID cards to non registered citizens, thus
enabling them to vote for the first time
Robinson, Ribas and Sucre Alphabetisation and educational programmes for adults
Ha´bitat Social housing
Vuelvan Caras now Che Guevara Active labour market programme that provides technical
training in order to help unemployed people set up their
own cooperatives
Milagro Eye care and eye surgery
Negra Hipo´lita Assistance to street children and homeless people, especially
drug addicts
Madres del Barrio Conditional cash transfer programme for indigent single
mothers
Mercal provided subsidised food in government-sponsored cooperatives. Mercal
responded to the food crisis provoked by the general strike in February 2003. The
programme was rolled out nationally when Cha´vez created Mercal by decree in
December 2004.
From 2004, the government used the massive windfall in oil revenues to
fund the expansion of the Missions; the government created a new Mission each
time it identified a new social need. There were approximately 30 Missions in
2008 (Aponte, 2007). Table 1 provides an overview of the main Missions and their
objectives.
The Missions are ad hoc administrations, parallel to the state. The
foundations administer the budgetary resources. In practice, each Mission is
placed under the authority of the presidency, bypassing the authority of the
ministries. Each Mission has a special budget. Volunteers from the NGO sector
or social movement (or both), referred to as facilitadores, play an important role
in the operation of the Missions. The facilitadores work in the barrios either
as social workers or instructors, sometimes both, in exchange for a meagre
salary. In executive posts, public employees are nominated on the basis of a
Venezuelan spoil system. These posts are referred to as ‘cargos de confianza y
libre remocio´n’, which means that employees are nominated on the basis of their
political affiliation and the nomination be revoked at any point in time. For
the opposition, the proliferation of the Missions is a symptom of three major
flaws: a pattern of institutional improvisation, a lack of long-term planning
and a clientelist redistribution of oil revenues to Cha´vez’s key constituency,
that is poor people. For the chavista administration, the Missions represent
another way of making social policy more in touch with people’s real needs and
more flexible than old-fashioned social policies. The administration argues that
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traditional bureaucracies such as departmental governments cannot implement
the outreach philosophy that is at the heart of the Missions. In particular,
the Missions meet existing needs locally, by providing immediate access to
social services via community engagement. The Missions rely on a network
of volunteers as well as community organisations and beneficiaries to identify
existing local social needs. Last but not least, the Missions are based on a holistic
model of social inclusion which attempts to address individual needs (culture,
education, health care, housing, employment, etc.) as well as local collective needs
(endogenous development initiatives and cooperatives funded by micro-credits).
The Missions represent, at least in theory, a social experiment which combines an
individual-centred approach with a local development model. They have become
the flagship social programmes of the government. Given the popularity of these
programmes, the opposition has promised to retain the main Missions should
they return to power.
Since 2004, the government has become increasingly radicalised (Buxton,
2007). The Cha´vez administration has renamed the ‘Bolivarian project’ ‘Socialism
for the 21st Century’, the contours of which can be defined by seven principles
and objectives:
• There should be rejection of the former Punto Fijo ‘partyarchy’ and its
redistribution of oil revenues to the upper and middle classes and its
redirection to a fraction of the low-income individuals and the lower-middle
class.
• The state should assume a proactive role in the economy as the motor of
the revolution through the nationalisation of strategic industries and the
promotion of economic development in textile, agriculture, manufacturing,
tourism and infrastructure (frentes de batalla productivos).
• Economic development should be endogenous and rest upon an economic
alliance in the region, so that the revolution can continue to export and
import under economically advantageous conditions for all parties.
• The state should shape the forms of the protagonist democracy, notably
by sponsoring and monitoring the Communal Councils (there is no
independent civil movement).
• People must play an active role in the revolutionary process (idea of a
permanent revolution) through civic engagement and involvement in the
construction of a socialist economy.
• Market-led mechanisms should ultimately disappear and be replaced instead
by alternative forms of resource allocation (state-led development, co-
management, cooperatives).
• The socialist project should promote new values (altruism, solidarity, social
utility of work as opposed to the pursuit of financial profit, consumerism and
individualism).
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It was in a context of increased political polarisation and radicalisation that
the Mission Vuelvan Caras was created in March 2004. Vuelvan Caras was an
active labour market programme, which helped the unemployed set up their
own socio-economic projects through the provision of generic and specialist
training. The aim was to create a model of endogenous development based on
local socio-economic projects. An important component of the generic training
course was to get recipients acquainted with new models of governance based
on solidarity and social utility. One of the leading intellectual influences behind
Vuelvan Caras was Carlos Lang, a member of the guerrillas in the 1960s–1970s.
Lang developed the idea of productive battlefronts (frentes de batalla productivos)
based on the collaboration between the people and the revolutionary government
in order to transform the country’s socio-economic structure through work
and education. Participants were given a monthly allocation. Once they had
received generic and specialised training, they were supposed to launch their own
economic projects, mainly cooperatives. In 2004–05, Vuelvan Caras had recruited
approximately 355,000 individuals, out of which 298,000 had received socio-
economic training; 264,720 had been authorised to create their cooperatives. In
total, 6,814 cooperatives had been created, as well as 130 units of endogenous
development (Observatorio Socialista de Venezuela, 2008).
According to senior officials in the MINEC and in the Fundacio´n Che
Guevara, Vuelvan Caras represented a governmental failure because individuals
were mainly attracted by the monthly allocation and because Vuelvan Caras
did not create a network of economically sustainable cooperatives or social
production enterprises. Five reasons account for this governmental failure.
First, the cooperatives faced tremendous difficulties in getting access to
circuits of distribution controlled by big corporations; many projects were not
economically viable, let alone profitable (d’Elia et al., 2006: 76, Pin˜eiro, 2009).
The government deplored the persistence of what it perceived to be a culture of
greed and idleness. Most individuals enrolled in the programme only to receive
the monthly allocation, a fact plainly acknowledged by the Vice-Ministry for
Training and Communal Development, Emma Hermoso.2 The problem, from
the government’s point of view, was that individuals were only motivated by
greed, instead of being inspired by altruism and solidarity.
Second, as pointed out by the most complete assessment of the Missions to
date (d’Elia et al., 2006), the constitution of cooperatives reflected a culture of
amateurism both on the participants’ and the government’s sides. On the par-
ticipants’ side, the following problems were identified: lack of managerial rigour
(most cooperatives did not even use book accounts), use of the cooperatives as
a means of increasing the flexibility of the workforce (exploitation) and internal
rivalries between associates. On the government’s side, there was insufficient
support and follow-up available to the cooperatives, especially in terms of admin-
istration, accountancy and human resources management (d’Elia et al., 2006: 77).
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Third, a phenomenon of massive desertion occurred as a result of irregulari-
ties in the payment of the monthly allowances to the facilitadores and beneficiaries
alike. For instance, in July 2004, the instructors in the state of Zulia organised
a demonstration to protest against the suppression of their monthly allowance.
From 2005, approximately 15,000 students quit the Mission. Indeed, the partici-
pants became demoralised and weary as they were also actively involved in edu-
cational Missions, in heath committees and in all the forms of community partic-
ipation sponsored by the government. One interviewee explained in this respect:
From 2005 to 2006 we witnessed a movement of massive desertion. Field work studies showed
that people became tired, especially as they had to deal with inefficiency in public administration
and implementation.3
Fourth, the programme suffered from a lack of interdepartmental coordination,
since Vuelvan Caras was placed under the authority of four different departments
(Department of Work, Department of Trade, Ministry of Defence and the
National Institute for Educational Cooperation, INCE). To address this problem,
the President placed the Mission under the authority of a single department,
the Ministry of Communal Economy, MINEC, renamed MINEP, in charge of
endogenous development projects. However, this measure failed to improve
significantly interdepartmental coordination at the central level. Fifth, the
programme suffered from a lack of continuity in terms of political orientations,
especially as there was a high degree of turnover at the executive level. This process
of permanent change became a clear obstacle to programme consolidation
(Hintze, 2008).
This failure led to a recalibration of the programme in September 2007. The
decree of 12August 2008 established the Fundacio´n Che Guevara to administer the
Mission. One of the main objectives of the Mission is to engineer revolutionary
social consciousness among its participants. In this respect, the creation of the
Mission reflects the radicalisation of the ‘Bolivarian Revolution’. The Mission
no longer aims to reduce unemployment but to create a new human being
according to the terms of the economic and social plan of 2007–13.4 The units of
endogenous development (NUDES), the cooperatives and enterprises of social
production represent the three major forms of the organisation of production
that aim to change radically the structure of the economy. The underlying idea
is that the new socialist economy will not be totally nationalised, as the private
sector will continue to play an important role in wealth creation. However,
the private sector will be crowded out by the development of the social and
communal economy. The new goal is also to establish a socialist communal
economy in partnership with the central government.5 There is no longer a
monthly allocation for programme participants.
In September 2008, personal observations based on informal conversations
with the personnel in the MINEC and interviews with senior officials suggested
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that the Mission Che Guevara suffered from a high degree of turnover as young
recruits were moved frequently between government departments. Almost all
the interviewees in Che Guevara were very recent appointees. All interviewees
had integrated the culture of permanent change associated with the last phase of
the ‘Bolivarian Revolution’. They were ready to move to other posts should the
revolution need their services in another programme. Adherence to change for
the necessities of the revolution has become a real mantra and guiding principle of
policy design. Such a culture of permanent change and turnover was detrimental
to programme consolidation, let alone institutionalisation, as various studies
have shown (D’Elia and Cabezas, 2008; Hintze, 2008).
In April 2010, when I interviewed Francy Rodriguez, President of the
Fundacio´n Che Guevara, she confirmed that the Mission was in a ‘difficult
situation’ and gave the ‘official line’ according to which the major problem with
the Mission was the lack of ideological and political formation. The objective,
she said, was to create ‘a new man whose actions are in agreement with his
discourses and values. There is a new focus on quality, both in terms of socialist
management, but also in terms of production.’ Asked to comment about the lack
of institutionalisation, which had been identified as one of the major problems
of the Mission, she acknowledged that this was an issue of concern. Indeed,
each official is a political appointee, but the appointment can be revoked at any
time, and Francy Rodriguez said ‘The Cubans criticised us for this, because there
is no continuity in executive posts.’6 The lack of institutionalisation represents
one of the major problems facing not only the Mission Che Guevara but also
the Missions in general. But this is hardly a new phenomenon in Venezuela’s
recent social history; indeed, antipoverty policies implemented by Hugo Cha´vez’s
predecessors equally suffered from a lack of institutionalisation. The issue of
policy continuity and sustainability reflects the lack of state capacity and failing
institutions, which constitutes an ongoing issue in Venezuela.
Ruptures and continuities
The Missions represent both a combination of ruptures and continuities. The
first major innovation was the rise in social expenditure. Social spending as a
proportion of the GDP increased from 8.8 per cent in 1990/91 to 11.7 per cent
in 2004/05 (CEPAL, 2007). This measure takes into account all social spending
programmes, including the Missions. For Penfold-Beccera (2007), total public
spending for the Missions represented 6 per cent of the GDP in 2006. Clearly,
the government of Hugo Cha´vez has made poverty alleviation a central political
priority, using oil revenues to sustain the rise in social spending. It is the amount of
money devoted to social investment and cash transfer programmes that represents
a break from the management of previous administrations. This spending effort
was made possible by the abundance of petrodollars from 2004, and by the fact
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that PdVSA was given a direct role in the social and economic development in
the Constitution of 1999.
Second, the government achieved a major reduction in poverty rates as
defined by the number of individuals living on less than US$1.25 a day. Between
1999 and 2001, poverty rates declined steeply, but rose again between 2001 and
2003, which explains Cha´vez’s loss of popularity among his core constituency
in 2002–03. However, the Missions were created in 2002–03, that is before oil
prices started rising and, more importantly, before the government could draw
additional revenues from the rising oil prices, which happened only in 2004.
Therefore, to explain the creation of the Missions as a result of the surge in
oil prices and subsequent governmental revenues would be a mistake. It is the
degradation of living standards in 2002 and 2003 and the subsequent loss of
legitimacy of the Cha´vez government that explained the creation of the Missions.
The Missions then played a crucial role in the mobilisation of the electorate,
especially with the Mission Identidad (Penfold-Beccera, 2007). Between 2005
and 2006, headcount poverty rates decreased from 37.1 per cent to 30.2 per cent
(CEPAL, 2007: 58). Social inequalities as measured by the GINI coefficient also
decreased sharply. The GINI index declined from 0.50 to 0.44 between 2002
and 2006 (CEPAL, 2007). In sum, the economic recovery, the reduction in open
unemployment and the multiplication of the Missions all contributed to the
decrease in poverty rates.
However, the Missions display important elements of continuity.
Traditionally social programmes were characterised by:
• a high reliance on oil revenues, which undermined the state’s ability to
implement coherent, long-term policies;
• a lack of political and institutional accountability as social programmes were
established outside the remit of existing institutions;
• high spending volatility due to the fluctuation in oil prices, and
• short-term opportunistic bureaucratic behaviour (Karl, 1997: 116–60).
As we shall see, these patterns continue to characterise the operation of the
Missions.
First, the Venezuelan social state remains highly dependent on oil revenues.
In practice, the government of Hugo Cha´vez was not prepared to monitor the
massive windfall in oil revenues created by the rise in oil prices. Like other
governments in the Punto Fijo regime (Karl, 1997), the new government did not
have the capacity to deal with such a sudden increase in revenues (Buxton, 2007).
According to Hidalgo (2009), Hugo Cha´vez made exactly the same mistakes as
his predecessors, especially Carlos Andre´s Pe´rez (1974–9). It is no coincidence
that the Missions proliferated precisely when the government started to reap the
benefits of the rise in oil prices. In fact, the reliance on oil revenues means that,
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paradoxically, Venezuelan state institutional capacities are severely limited, as
demonstrated by Karl (1997).
Second, the Missions exacerbate the pattern of institutional bypassing that
had characterised previous antipoverty programmes in the period 1990–1999.
In contemporary Venezuela, the personnel of the foundations administer the
day-to-day activities of the Missions, since each Mission is placed under the
responsibility of a specific foundation. The same operational principles were
applied to ad hoc antipoverty programmes developed during the presidencies of
Carlos Andre´s Pe´rez and Raphael Caldera. In this respect, there is a strong pattern
of continuity, which suggests that the enduring problem of weak institutions has
not been addressed by the current government.
Third, there is ample evidence of a short-term vision based on the belief that
oil revenues are by definition going to increase, thus allowing the government to
subsidise projects and local initiatives that are not economically viable. This is
particularly obvious in the case of the cooperatives, the development of which
corresponds to massive job creation programmes through the injection of micro-
credits in the local economy. But, left to their own devices, a sizeable majority
of these cooperatives and endogenous development projects would simply not
survive. Cooperative members often lack basic administrative and technical skills
and are as a result unable to compete with their capitalist counterparts, even with
the massive injection of micro-credit (Pin˜eiro, 2009: 841–2). There is thus a strong
element of window-dressing for micro-development projects, which, on closer
inspection, are the functional equivalent of occupational welfare programmes.
This is a commonly held view in the literature on cooperatives and social
development projects in Venezuela (Hintze, 2009, Pin˜eiro, 2009). Moreover,
this claim has been backed up by participant observations. Indeed, most of
the cooperatives visited in Caracas in September 2008 were specialised in the
production of uniforms, to the extent that after each interview I was given Che
Guevara hats and various kinds of revolutionary T-shirts.
Officials admit, albeit indirectly, that the cooperatives do not have an
economic or productive rationale. According to a representative of the Direction
of Cooperatives (SUNACOP), the real purpose of the cooperatives is not to
increase national production and to diversify the economy, but to give local
people a sense of purpose and a job. In other words, it is social utility, not
economic utility, that matters, which is of course consistent with the Marxist
perspective that underlines the ‘Bolivarian revolution’:
Cooperatives represent a new way of life, a means of improving people’s living standards, a way
of giving people a work full of dignity and exempt of exploitation.7
When pressed to answer a question about the economic viability of the
cooperatives, the representative dismissed the question by stating that:
We’ll have oil for the next 100 years so we use these resources to invest in the popular economy.8
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Fourth, with a few exceptions, especially in relation to Madres del Barrio
which seems to operate on an institutionalised and routinely formalised
basis, in some crucial ways most of the interviewees in the administration
appear to lack experience, insight and expertise. This is particularly true
of the younger recruits in Che Guevara, who appear to have been chosen
on the basis of their political loyalty. In particular, interview data suggest
that younger members of the chavista administration are either political
activists who have been promoted to an administrative post (and, in some
cases, a ministerial position) or young technocrats who have been nominated
on the basis of their political and ideological affinity with the ‘Bolivarian
Revolution’. These remarks cannot be generalised; indeed, they only apply
to the Mission Che Guevara. But, at least in the case of Che Guevara,
this suggests that programme operation is characterised by some degree of
inexperience. Whether such policies can become institutionalised is thus open to
question.
Fifth, the administration promotes the notion of individual responsibility
in order to break with the culture of perceived facility and passivity which
had characterised the relationship between the state welfare recipients in the
past (Chacı´n, 2003). Somewhat surprisingly for an otherwise ‘revolutionary’
administration, senior officials manifest a strong adhesion to relatively socially
conservative values, such as the belief in the work ethic and moral agency. They
also reject idleness and passivity. Such moralist discourses are familiar to the
author, who has commented upon similar discourses in completely different con-
texts, namely welfare reform in the UK and in the United States (Daguerre, 2004,
2008).
The Mission Madres del Barrio is typical of a temporary, conditional cash
assistance programme. Indeed, single mothers receive a monthly allowance which
can be withdrawn if they do not comply with programme requirements, such
as sending their children to school or getting involved in community work. The
Mission operates in two phases. In the first phase, women receive a wide range
of support in order to prepare them to participate in the second phase of the
programme. In this second phase, women have to design their own economic
project, be it a cooperative or any form of social enterprise. Projects are subsidised
by micro-credit, and the ultimate aim of the programme is individual self-
sufficiency and autonomy, as explained by a representative of the Mission Madres
del Barrio in Caracas:
With his financial help, mothers will improve their lives at all levels. But the ultimate goal is
that they walk alone, help is temporary.9
In other words, the Missions are based on the notion of an active citizenship.
Social policy aims to promote financial self-sufficiency on terms that contradict
the Marxist principles that underlie other elements of the ‘Bolivarian revolution’.
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Conclusion
This article has argued that, despite real and positive changes compared to the
Punto Fijo period (1958–98), the Social Missions have yet not been integrated
into the state apparatus. The government of Hugo Cha´vez has inherited weak
institutions and has not been able to reinforce the state apparatus. The lack
of institutional capacity, which was one of the major flaws of the Punto Fijo
regime (Buxton, 2007), continues to characterise the Venezuelan state under
the presidency of Hugo Cha´vez, suggesting a strong underlying pattern of path-
dependency. In particular, the government of Hugo Cha´vez has been unable
to implement a comprehensive reform of the social insurance system, which
instead has been allowed to atrophy. Moreover, the social agenda is governed by
contradictory ideological imperatives. On the one hand, the current government
wants to place wellbeing and human value at the heart of its vaguely defined
‘Bolivarian project’; but, on the other hand, it emphasises very individualist and
moralistic values such as absence of individual responsibility and agency. This
is part of the legacy of the 1990s Social Policy Agenda which has shaped most
conditional social programmes in Latin America. Indeed, most of the Missions
reproduce crucial components of the antipoverty programmes initiated under
the presidency of Carlos Andre´s Pe´rez in the early 1990s, for two main reasons.
First, they exaggerate the pattern of institutional bypassing that had prevailed
during the last years of the Punto Fijo regime. Second, they are based on values and
operating principles (community participation, NGOs’ involvement, individual
responsibility) which have been formalised by the World Bank in the 1990s.
But the most important element of continuity remains the dependence on oil
revenues, and the vulnerability of social programmes to external shocks such
as falling commodity prices in petro states. In the past, such dependence has
led to tremendous fluctuations in social expenditure, thus undermining the role
of automatic stabilisers generally attributed to social programmes at times of
economic crisis. Whether the current government will be able to maintain the
level of social spending at the level of 2003–06 is open to question, and certainly
past experiences suggest that governments did not manage to protect citizens
against rising social risks at times of economic crisis.
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Notes
1 The alliance between the people and the military has been a crucial element of the socialist
‘Bolivarian’ project. As a result, a number of local development initiatives include the full
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participation of the military. Young recruits routinely work the land or are involved in other
forms of practical and material support.
2 Interview with Emma Rosa Hermoso, Viceministra de Formacion y Desarrollo Comunal,
Caracas, September 2008.
3 Interview with Hector Constant, professor in the UCV, Instituto de Altos Estudiosos
Diploma´ticos, Caracas, September 2008.
4 Gaceta Oficial de la Repu´blica Bolivariana de Venezuela, n◦38.955, Caracas, 15 August 2008.
5 Gaceta Oficial de la Repu´blica Bolivariana de Venezuela, n◦38.955, Caracas, 15 August 2008.
6 Interview with Francy Rodrı´guez, Fundacio´n Che Guevara, Caracas, September 2010.
7 Interview with a representative of the direction of cooperatives, SUNACOOP, Caracas,
September 2008.
8 Interview with a representative of the direction of cooperatives, SUNACOOP, Caracas,
September 2008.
9 Interview with Claudia Cha´vez, Coordinacio´n Madres del Barrio, District Libertador, Caracas,
September 2008.
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